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Life, Death, and Neuroimaging:
The Advantages and
Disadvantages of the Defense's Use
of Neuroimages in Capital Cases
-Lessons from the Front
by John H. Blume*
and Emily C. Panvola"
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, commentators and scholars from the
medical, legal, and social science fields have produced a massive body of
literature on the intersection of law and neuroimaging.1 Earlier
writings focused on explaining various new techniques for developing
brain images, exploring how such images might be relevant in legal
proceedings, and addressing evidentiary issues posed by the use of such
images in court.2 More recent publications correspond with a vast
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project, Ithaca,
New York. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (B.A., 1978); Yale University
Divinity School (M.A.R., 1982); Yale Law School (J.D., 1984). Member, State Bar of South
Carolina.
** Executive Director, Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center, Columbia, South
Carolina. Baylor University (BA., 2001); Cornell Law School (J.D., 2005). Member, State
Bars of New York, Indiana, and South Carolina.
1. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience for Criminal
Law and Procedure, 8 OIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 119, 119 (2010) ("The explosion of knowledge
in cognitive neuroscience over the past decade has been stunning.").
2. See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech
Crystal Ball?, 49 STAND. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1997) ("This note explores the thorny
evidentiary issues posed by neuroiaging in the context of psychiatric diagnosis, an area
in which standards for admitting expert testimony are poorly articulated.").
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expansion of research and funding in the area of neuroscience and
address a wide variety of topics, such as the use of neuroimaging to
detect deception,' predict recidivism and future dangerousness,' explain
the effects of trauma and mental illness,' gather information from
international terrorists,' and even predict whether a person has a
general propensity for violence.' Other, more cautionary pieces have
raised questions about the ethical implications as well as the financial,
social, and moral costs associated with the use of neuroimaging in these
contexts.8
In this Article, we examine the use of neuroimaging in capital cases
with a practical, case-based perspective and conclude that brain imaging
can be an important, helpful, and successful tool for capital defenders,
but there are serious risks that must be considered before determining
whether to employ these techniques. Drawing on examples from our
own practice, we discuss the role neuroimaging can play in capital cases.
More importantly, however, we also discuss the pros and cons of the
defense's use of neuroimaging in these cases. Our take-home message
is that neuroimaging is never the first option in a capital case, and it
should only be considered after (1) a comprehensive social history
investigation has been conducted; (2) a comprehensive neuropsychologi-
cal battery of tests has been administered to the client; and (3) the client
3. See generally, e.g., Margaret Talbot, Duped: Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?, NEW
YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 52.
4. See, e.g., David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 45 HOUS. LAW, Apr. 2008,
at 36, 37 ("Can neuroscience inform sentencing guidelines by offering better prediction of
recidivism?"). See generally J.W. Looney, Neuroscience's New Techniques for Evaluating
Future Dangerousness: Are We Returning to Lombroso's Biological Criminality?, 32 U. ARK.
LIrLE ROCK L. REV. 301 (2010).
5. See generally Lydia D. Johnson, Guilty or Innocent? ... Just Take a Look at My
Brain-Analyzing the Nexus Between Traumatic Brain Injury and Criminal Responsibility,
37 S.U. L. REv. 25 (2009).
6. See generally Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism:
A "No Brainer"or a Human Rights Hazard?, 33 Am. J.L. & MED. 483 (2007); Jennifer Wild,
Brain Imaging Ready to Detect Terrorist, Say Neuroscientists, 437 NATURE 457, 457 (2005).
7. See 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity"of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1266 n.2 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing an
article in the New York Times Magazine that predicted "brain scanning to identify criminal
suspects" would be a topic that the Supreme Court of the United States may be called upon
to address in the future).
8. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, 'And I See Through Your Brain:" Access to Experts,
Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging
Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 25-43 (2009) (raising
ethical considerations related to a criminal defendant's competency to consent to the
imposition of a neuroimaging test or examination, and the impact of antipsychotic
medications at the time that such a test is performed).
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has been evaluated by a neuropsychiatrist or neurologist who is familiar
with neuropsychological testing and its social history and who is
sensitive to the dangers of neuroimaging. In sum, neuroimaging is not
an investigative tool; it is a confirmatory and explanatory tool (and even
then, only in the right case). Part II of this Article briefly describes
some of the most commonly used imaging techniques in capital cases.
Part III uses a case example to illustrate how a carefully crafted
mitigation story can successfully incorporate cutting-edge brain imaging.
Part IV, however, describes some potential disadvantages and risks we
have experienced. Part V concludes this Article with a brief list of
practical "lessons from the front."
II. BACKGROUND: TYPES OF NEUROLOGICAL TESTING USED IN
CAPITAL CASES
Others have already written extensively and aptly about the variety
of neuroimaging techniques that exist, how the techniques work, and the
pros and cons of each technique.9 By way of background, we offer a
brief summary of the testing methods most commonly used in capital
cases.
A. Nonimaging Methods of Testing
Long before neuroimaging became common, there were-and still are-a
variety of nonimaging testing methods available to measure brain
dysfunction.
1. Neuropsychological Assessment. Neuropsychological assess-
ment is a method-and, we submit, the most reliable method-for
acquiring data about a subject's cognitive, emotional, and executive
functions.' 0 Neuropsychological tests use specifically designed tasks to
measure a psychological function that is known to be linked to a
particular brain structure or pathway. Some of the major domains of
functioning that can be assessed with neuropsychological testing include:
(1) attention and concentration; (2) visual perception and reasoning; (3)
memory; (4) learning; (5) verbal functions; (6) academic skills; (7)
construction; (8) concept formation; (9) self-regulation and motor ability;
and (10) emotional status. An expert making a neuropsychological
assessment often gives a battery of commonly used tests to measure each
of the major domains.u The subject's raw score on each test is typically
9. See generally Kulynych, supra note 2.
10. MURIEL DEUTSCH LEZAK, NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 20 (3d ed. 1995).
11. Id. at 121-22.
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compared to a general-population normative sample that should ideally
be drawn from a population comparable to the person being exam-
ined. 12 Normative studies frequently provide data stratified by age,
level of education, or ethnicity. In addition to individual testing, a
neuropsychological assessment may also focus on a person's psychologi-
cal, personal, interpersonal, and wider contextual circumstances.
2. Neurological Evaluation. A neurological evaluation is a clinical
assessment aimed at detecting any abnormalities that may be related to
a dysfunction in the nervous system."3 The evaluation is generally
conducted by a specialist in neurological disorders, such as a neurologist
or a neurosurgeon, depending on the disorder in question. A neurologi-
cal evaluation may include up to three general components: (1) a review
of the individual's medical and social history, including any present
medical complaints; (2) a general neurological examination; and (3)
diagnostic testing focused on the nervous system."' The neurological
exam is a physical examination focused on the parts and functions of the
body that are most often impacted by a problem in the central nervous
system. It may include an examination of the head and neck, cranial
nerves, motor skills, reflexes, coordination and gait, and sensory
abilities. After a review of the individual's history and present
functioning, more targeted diagnostic testing can be used to help detect
or confirm a suspected pathology." Diagnostic testing can include
neuroimaging, but the testing may also consist of nonimaging tech-
niques, such as nerve conduction studies, blood tests, testing of spinal
fluid, and biopsy or removal of tumors.
3. Neuropsychiatric Evaluation. Much like a neuropsychological
evaluation, a neuropsychiatric evaluation is intended to measure
cognitive and mental functioning, but the latter focuses more specifically
on mental disorders associated with diseases of the nervous system.
Neuropsychiatry is a subspecialty of psychiatry rooted in the idea that
psychiatric symptoms are traditionally often linked with specific brain
structures and abnormalities. A neuropsychiatric evaluation can be
performed by a neuropsychiatrist or by a traditional psychiatrist who
seeks referrals for additional neurological testing to compliment the
psychiatric evaluation.
12. Id. at 98-99.
13. See BERNARD J. ALPERS & ELLiorr L. MANCALL, ESSENTIALS OF THE NEUROLOGI-
CAL EXAMINATION 1-32 (4th ed. 1975).
14. See id. (discussing appropriate steps for a complete neurological evaluation).
15. Id.
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B. Structural Imaging
Structural imaging produces digital representations of the brain's
anatomical makeup.16  'e two principal techniques for structural
neuroimaging are computed tomography (CT) scanning and magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI)."u' Professor Snead, in his paper entitled
Neuroimaging and the 'Complexity' of Capital Punishment, provides an
accurate and succinct description of these two techniques:
CT scanning, introduced in 1972, uses x-rays and a computerized
algorithm to reconstruct an image of the brain. CT scanning has been
largely supplanted by MRI, which has superior spacial resolution. MRI
constructs a computerized image of the brain by measuring the signal
strengths of the various radio frequencies emitted by the proton nuclei
of atoms in brain tissue when the protons are placed in a strong
magnetic field."8
C. Functional Imaging
Functional images, which depict the brain in action, include positron
emission tomography (PET) scans, single-photon emission computed
tomography (SPECT) scans, and functional MRI (fMRI) scans.1 All
three methods "show activity within the brain by tracing the location or
concentration of various molecules. 20 One commentator has explained,
These technologies allow living brains to be observed, both as their
shape changes over time and as they function, by watching the location
and timing of glucose and oxygen consumption. These functional
capabilities are allowing researchers to watch what areas of the brain
are in greater or lesser use as test subjects use their brains-for
movement, for sensation, for emotion, or for thought.21
D. Comparison Analysis
The traditional mode of neuroimaging analysis has been a visual
review of the scan films by a radiologist or a neurologist. This method
creates a number of problems related to subjectivity, bias, and error,
which we discuss more fully below. The films or scans are generated
16. Snead, supra note 7, at 1281.
17. Id.
18. Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. Henry T. Greely, Neuroethics and ELSI: Similarities and Differences, 7 MINN. J.
L. Sci. & TECH. 599, 612 (2006).
20. Id. (emphasis omitted).
21. Id. at 612-13.
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from the underlying computer data, which is generally known as the
"dicom." A growing number of research centers have developed methods
for quantitatively analyzing the dicom for (a) a more precise analysis of
the brain structure and function and (b) a more sophisticated analysis
by comparison with a known set of "normal" or "abnormal" brains.22 In
essence, quantitative analysis allows very precise computer algorithims
to analyze the data generated during the imaging study. Rather than
having a radiologist examine the film to see if the brain looks normal
(for example, whether various brain structures are the right size and
shape) or is generally functioning properly, a computer analyzes the
data. Quantitative analysis results in a more precise-and, it is hoped,
more accurate-determination of whether the brain is structurally and
functionally normal. Furthermore, quantitative anslysis can permit a
comparison of an individual client's brain to a database of brains with
known abnormalities (such as schizophrenia).23
III. NEUROIMAGING CAN HELP MAKE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE
AND DEATH
A. Understanding the Mitigation Story
In order to explain what role neuroimaging can play in a mitigation
presentation, we must first briefly explain the purpose and function of
mitigation. A capital trial proceeds in two basic parts.24 During the
guilt-or-innocence phase, the jury determines whether the State has met
its burden of proving that the defendant committed the alleged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.' If the jury finds the defendant guilty of
the capital crime, the case proceeds into a penalty phase, during which
the jurors hear evidence of aggravation from the State along with any
evidence in mitigation that the defense team offers for the jury's
consideration. "Unlike the decision the jurors made during the guilt-
or-innocence phase of the proceedings, however, this decision is not, at
22. See, e.g., Raquel Gur et al., Regional Brain Function in Schizophrenia: I. A Positron
Emission Tomography Study, 44 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119, 124 (1987); Ruben Gur
et al., Sex Differences in Regional Cerebral Glucose Metabolism During a Resting State, 267
SCIENCE 528, 531 (1995); J. Daniel Ragland et al., PET Regional Cerebral Blood Flow
Change During Working and Declarative Memory: Relationship With Task Performance, 11
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 222, 229-30 (1997).
23. See Gur et al., Regional Brain Function in Schizophrenia, supra note 22, at 124.
24. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe
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its core, a determination of fact, for example, did the defendant 'do it,'
but a moral and normative choice-does he deserve to die?"27 This
decision will largely turn on whether the jurors are persuaded by the
defendant's mitigation story.' In the thirty-four years since the
Supreme Court of the United States first mandated individualized
sentencing in capital cases,' courts and commentators have employed
a host of definitions to explain the meaning of the word "mitigation.'"3 0
Russell Stetler, National Mitigation Coordinator for the federal death
penalty projects, has described mitigation as "the empathy-evoking
evidence that attempts to humanize the accused killer in death penalty
cases" and as a mysterious phenomenon with the "transformative
capacity to enable jurors to feel human kinship with someone whom they
have just convicted of an often monstrous crime."3 In the context of
explaining an expert's role in evaluating and presenting evidence of a
mental disability or condition in a capital case, Stetler suggests that it
is instructive to think in terms of what mitigation is not:
Mitigation is not a defense to prosecution. It is not an excuse for the
crime. It is not a reason the client should "get away with it." Instead,
mitigation is a means of introducing evidence of a disability or
condition which inspires compassion, but which offers neither
justification nor excuse for the capital crime. Unlike the insanity and
competency requirements, mitigation need not involve a mental
"disease" or "defect." Mitigation does not require a diagnosis. The
expert who assists a capital defense team is not there either for the
traditional forensic purpose (assessing competency and/or responsibili-
ty) or for the routine goals of a clinician (diagnosis in order to prescribe
treatment). If the expert testifies, it may simply be to help jurors
appreciate the world as the client experiences it.
Mitigation provides the biography of mental disability. It explains
the influences that converged in the years, days, hours, minutes, and
seconds leading up to the capital crime, and how information was
27. John H. Blume, et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing
and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HoPSTRA L. REv. 1035, 1035 (2008).
28. Id. at 1037-38 (explaining that empirical evidence shows that the mitigation
presentation heavily influences jurors' views on what is most important in deciding
whether to sentence a particular defendant to death or life imprisonment).
29. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (holding that Georgia's reenacted
death penalty statute is constitutional in part because it allows for mercy based on
individualized consideration).
30. See Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1229 (1995).
31. Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned
Moral Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 237 (2008).
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processed in a damaged brain. It is a basis for compassion-not an
excuse.32
Others have spoken of mitigation in terms of telling the defendant's
story: "credibly telling the defendant's story can make the difference
between life and death."' To demonstrate how neuroimaging can be
a successful piece of the mitigation story, we employ a hypothetical case
study.' Our hypothetical looks at the case of Zachary Short and
compares the abbreviated life story told at Short's capital trial with the
more robust mitigation picture-one that incorporates neuroimaging-that
was presented on Short's behalf in state post-conviction relief proceed-
35ings.
32. Id. at 261-62. The Supreme Court has consistently defined mitigation in the
broadest possible terms. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court
explained that if our society chooses to impose the ultimate punishment, the Eighth
Amendment requires that we do so by individualized determinations that permit
consideration of "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the
diverse frailties of humankind." Id. at 304. The Court later reiterated that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis omitted); see also Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6 (1986);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982). More recently, the Court has stated,
"[virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant
may introduce concerning his own circumstances." Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285
(2004) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991)).
33. Blume et al., supra note 27, at 1038; see also Michelle E. Barnett et al., When
Mitigaiton Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating Evidence on Sentencing
Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAv. Sol. & L. 751,754,762-65 (2004) (using ten different
vignettes to demonstrate that factors such as severe abuse as a child and mental
retardation mitigated the likelihood of a death sentence); Stephen P. Garvey, The
Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000). Garvey wrote in
relevant part as follows:
Telling a defendant's story does indeed appear to have its intended emotional
effect.... If a juror believed that the defendant experienced the torment of abuse
as a child, labored under the burden of a mental defect or mental retardation, was
emotionally disturbed, battled with alcoholism . . ., was a loner in the world, or
had generally gotten a raw deal in life, the usual response was sympathy or pity.
Garvey, supra, at 57 (footnotes omitted).
34. This hypothetical is based upon examples from our experiences in actual cases that
they have litigated or are currently litigating. To protect the confidences of their clients,
we have chosen to use a hypothetical example. All names, locations, and other details are
fictional, and any similarities to actual cases should be regarded as coincidence. We do not
suggest, however, that this example is pure fantasy. Indeed, we see examples just like this
one regularly.
35. State post-conviction relief is a mechanism designed to address trial errors
grounded in state or federal law that were not available for direct review. Thus, a post-
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B. The rial Story
In 2005 Zachary Short was tried for the murder of a police officer in
a rural community in Aiken, South Carolina. Short was a thirty-two-
year-old, white male with a tenth-grade education. During the guilt-or-
innocence phase of his capital trial, the State offered evidence to
establish that Short spent the day of the crime in the woods behind his
home, drinking beers with friends and target shooting. Around 5:30
p.m., Short walked to the home of his estranged girlfriend, Shannon
Morales, which was not far from his own home. Short still carried the
pistol that he had used to shoot at beer cans earlier in the day. He
pounded on the back door, asking Morales to come outside so that he
could speak with her. Instead, she called the police, but by the time
Officer Steve Simon arrived, Short was nowhere to be found. Officer
Simon searched the woods behind Morales's house but found nothing.
The area of town where both Short and Morales lived was notoriously
known as the "white trash" part of town. Domestic disputes, public
drunkenness, drug possession, theft, and other similar crimes were
commonplace in that area. Officer Simon took down Morales's name and
information, told her to call back if she had any more trouble, and drove
away.
Approximately one hour after Morales first called the police, Short
returned and recommenced banging on the back door of Morales's house.
Morales called 911. Officer Simon responded to the call, telling
dispatchers that he had already been to the scene earlier that day, and
he was not far away when he received the call. By all accounts, it was
dark by the time Officer Simon arrived, and he had not turned on his
blue lights or siren. He parked in Morales's front yard, got out of the car
carrying a flashlight and a portable radio, and circled around to the back
door. Morales later recounted that she heard a noise like someone
yelling "halt" or "stop," followed by three or four gunshots in rapid
succession. She called 911 for a third time that day, this time to report
a shooting. Additional officers responding to the call found Officer
Simon lying a few feet from the back door, shot twice in the head. The
police quickly organized a search of the wooded area behind Morales's
conviction lawyer looks back at what occurred at trial and raises any "off the record" errors
that may warrant post-conviction relief. A trial attorney's failure to investigate and
present evidence ofneurological damage (through the use of neuroimages or other evidence)
is an example of a post-conviction claim. For a detailed discussion on post-conviction
procedure, see generally John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, A Reintroduction: Survival
Skills for Post-Conviction Practice in South Carolina, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 223 (2010).
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house. Short was found a few hours later, lying on the ground in a
heavily wooded area with the murder weapon beside him.
The State argued that Short knew Officer Simon had come out to the
scene on the first occasion and that Short waited, watching from the
woods, until Simon went away. The State asserted that from the
vantage point of Morales's back door, Short must have seen Officer
Simon's headlights coming down the road when he returned for the
second time. Short knew that Officer Simon was on the way, so he
waited, aimed carefully until he had a clear shot, and then ambushed
the unsuspecting policeman. The defense's theory was that after
drinking beer all day long, Short was extremely drunk and unaware of
what he was doing. Short's attorneys suggested that the shooting was
an accident, and Short had fired at Officer Simon because he was
surprised by the officer's presence. The defense presented the testimony
of an expert in psychopharmacology who told the jury that Short had a
drug and alcohol problem. He estimated that Short's blood alcohol level
was between 0.18 and 0.71 based on Short's self-report on the amount
of alcohol he had consumed over the course of the day. The jury
deliberated for forty-eight minutes before finding that Short was guilty
of murder.
In the penalty phase, the State focused on showing the impact that
Officer Simon's death had on his family members and friends. Officer
Simon's widow, father, brother, extended family members, and former
fellow officers all testified that he was a wonderful person and that his
death had devastated them. They further testified that Officer Simon's
death had negatively impacted the police force and the many community
charities and civic organizations in which he was involved. The State
also argued that Short was a "career criminal" who would continue to
misbehave if sentenced to life in prison because he had committed
several prior petty crimes, such as stealing from his workplace and
breaking into cars.
The defense relied primarily on the testimony of a social worker who
explained that Short grew up in a poor family. The social worker
testified that Short lived with his mother and three siblings. His father
spent most of his time in and out of jail. Short's mother had a boyfriend
who was married with a family of his own. The boyfriend was an angry
and volatile man. The social worker suspected that the boyfriend had
been physically violent on some occasions, but she had no records or
other documentary evidence to confirm those suspicions. Similarly, the
social worker claimed that the boyfriend had tried to sexually abuse
Short's sisters, but again, she had no evidence to corroborate that claim,
and she could not say whether Short was aware of any alleged sexual
abuse. Finally, the social worker told the jury that despite Short's
918 [Vol. 62
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mother's poverty, lack of education, and other shortcomings, Short's
mother did her best to raise her children well and provide for their basic
needs.
Once again, the jury deliberations were short. This time it took only
forty-six minutes for them to decide that Zachary Short should be
sentenced to death. Afterwards, several of the jurors recounted how they
had come to their decision:
"There wasn't really much to talk about. It was clear that he did it.
When it came time to decide the sentence, we all felt very bad for
Officer Simon's wife and children. His death was senseless. There was
no excuse for it."
"I didn't feel bad for Zachary Short. So what if he was drunk?
That's no reason to kill somebody."
"All of the jurors cried when Officer Simon's widow talked about how
his death had affected her and their children. He was a good man, and
he did a lot of good things for the community. I felt so sorry for his
family because they had to sit through the trial and hear all of that
testimony about how he died. Zachary Short was poor and his daddy
wasn't around? So what? Lots of people have a hard life, but they
don't go out and kill somebody over it."
"I didn't hear anything from the defense to persuade me to have
mercy on Zachary Short. As far as I am concerned, he is a cold-blooded
killer. He deserves to die."
C. The Post-Conviction Story
In preparation for his post-conviction relief proceedings, Zachary
Short's post-conviction attorneys began investigating his life history from
scratch. The investigation showed that Short had a much more robust
and compelling mitigation story worth telling-one that the jury at his
trial had never heard.
Zachary Short was born to William and Sarah Short one year after his
oldest sister, Molly. His two younger siblings, Alex and Teresa, followed
shortly thereafter. William Short had only a seventh-grade education
and worked as a sharecropper. He was also an alcoholic who was
frequently arrested for driving under the influence, public drunkenness,
welfare fraud, and petty theft. Both of Zachary's grandfathers, along
with a long list of aunts, uncles, and cousins, also struggled with alcohol
and drug addiction. The Short family lived in poverty. When William
was not in jail, he was drinking, and the family never had enough
money to pay the bills. While William was away in jail, Sarah Short
began an affair with a married man named James Matthews, whose
habits closely mirrored William's. Matthews had a wife and four
children of his own.
9192011]
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After the affair began, Sarah and William officially separated.
Zachary was approximately three years old. Sarah moved into a trailer
next to the one Matthews shared with his wife and children. The
families lived side-by-side for the rest of their lives, with Matthews
acting as a dysfunctional father figure for both groups. They lived in a
run-down section of town-an area filled with tiny shacks and dilapidated
mobile homes surrounded by industrial factories and plants. Other
people in town called it "the Boulevard," denoted by a long stretch of
highway dividing the nice part of town from the disfavored area, which
was filled with smokestacks and raw industrial stench. Even among
their fellow residents of the Boulevard, the Shorts were the subject of
constant gossip and ridicule because of their unconventional living
arrangements. One neighbor recalled a name she used to describe them:
I called them the circus family. They lived in like a compound-two
trailers right next to each other. There was a constant stream of
people in and out of both houses-eight children, three adults, tons of
cousins and relatives. Everyone just came and went like they all lived
there. People were always getting drunk, fighting, getting arrested.
It was chaos. Their situation was embarrassing. Matthews was a
mean, violent drunk. He would beat the children and the "wives." It
was humiliating the way he treated all of them. Everyone said that he
sexually molested those girls. I don't know. I never asked. Most
people tried to avoid the whole family. They just attracted trouble.
Children with struggles at home often turn to other outlets-school, for
example-for stability and self-confidence.36 Zachary Short, however,
found no comfort in his academic studies. Instead, he consistently
struggled in school. After he failed the first and third grades, he was
referred for psychological testing. He scored poorly. His intelligence
quotient (IQ) was measured to be in the mid-seventies." The psycholo-
gist reported that Short had difficulties with visual perception, memory,
sequencing, and spatial abilities. She determined that Short functioned
in the Educably Mentally Handicapped range and recommended that he
be placed in a school resource program for special assistance with his
classes. Despite this extra help, Short's grades remained very low. He
was occasionally placed in, or socially promoted to, higher grades, never
36. See JAMES GARBARINO, LOST Boys: WHY OUR SONS TURN VIOLENT AND How WE
CAN SAVE THEM 168 (Anchor Books 2000).
37. An IQ score of sixty-five to seventy-five is within the range of mild mental
retardation. See AAIDD Ad Hoc Committee on Terminology and Classification,
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 36
(11th ed. 2010); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41-42 (4th ed. text rev. 2000).
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achieving the necessary standards for earned promotion. Eventually, he
dropped out of school in the tenth grade. His parents never attended a
parent-teacher conference. His mother routinely failed to pay his
minimal book fees and complete other basic registration requirements.
Many of Short's teachers seemed to overlook him entirely. Years later,
most of them could not even remember him, even though they had all
heard about the capital crime with which he was charged. Short's
eighth and ninth grade resource teacher-the one assigned specifically to
give him extra help-had only a vague memory of him:
Zachary Short is the one who killed that cop? I remember him a little
bit. He missed a lot of school. I am sort of surprised that he would do
something like that. He didn't seem all that bad to me. He was what
I would call "a good ole redneck." His family lived on the Boulevard.
The people who live over there are the kind who watch NASCAR and
drink beer all weekend long. I don't really remember how he did in
school. He must not have been doing very well if he was in my
resource class. I bet he just didn't try very hard.
Each of Short's three siblings had similar school difficulties and
intellectual deficiencies. His brother, Alex, was tested and diagnosed
with mental retardation in the fourth grade. Alex was Short's only
sibling who completed all twelve grades in school, but Alex did not
receive a diploma because he was unable to pass the exit-testing
requirements. Short's oldest sister, Molly, tested in the borderline
mentally retarded range on IQ tests, became pregnant in the tenth
grade, and never returned to school after that. Short's youngest sister,
Teresa, received special education services from the time she was in
preschool. Teresa's teachers noted that she had poor personal hy-
giene-her clothes, face, and hair were often dirty-and she frequently
requested food shortly after arriving at school. Her behavior at
mealtimes was recorded as "extremely hungry." Like her oldest brother
and sister, Teresa dropped out of school in the tenth grade. She was
later treated for depression, psychosis, and suicidal thoughts.
Sarah Short, Short's mother, had only a sixth-grade education. Like
her family members, Sarah also abused alcohol, although she kept her
drinking much more private than her husband, her boyfriend, or many
of her relatives. To make ends-meet for herself and her children, Sarah
became involved in crime. She took the children to the mall in a
neighboring city and taught them to steal clothes and other items from
department stores. She took objects out of the donation bins behind the
Salvation Army and later sold them at flea markets. She stole checks
and encouraged her children to do the same. Once, when Sarah could
no longer afford her car payments, she and her kids took her car out to
the river and sank it. Short followed his mother's example. At her
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suggestion, he began taking chickens and eggs from neighbors' yards.
Then he moved on to stealing cigarettes and beer from convenience
stores. Eventually, Short progressed to stealing larger items, such as
machinery and appliances from local businesses and empty cars. He was
first arrested for shoplifting at age thirteen. Three years later, he
confessed to a series of break-ins at local shops. After that, Short was
arrested several more times for similar crimes, as well as for driving
under the influence, before he was charged with the murder of Officer
Simon.
Short had several medical problems. At least three serious head
injuries with loss of consciousness were listed in his hospital records-two
from car accidents and one from when a car transmission fell onto his
head while he was doing some mechanic work. His school records
chronicled a long history of low weight and short stature. His teachers
and doctors consistently recorded that Short was very small for his age.
At school, it was noted that he tired easily, was frequently ill, was
frequently inattentive, and had difficulty with impulse control.
Thus, Short's life history-compiled from school, medical, and legal
records as well as interviews with his teachers, friends, employers, and
extended family members-pointed to several overarching mitigation
themes. This history, however, also specifically suggested neurological
damage from more than one potential cause. First, the cognitive
deficiencies noted in Zachary's school records, along with his history of
head injury and other traumas, pointed to potential brain damage.
Second, maternal ingestion of alcohol, abnormally small size or failure
to thrive in childhood, and difficulties with impulse control are all signs
of a specific form of brain damage caused by Fetal Alcohol Spectrum
Disorder. Finally, the Boulevard area of town itself proposed yet
another etiology. The multiple industrial businesses in and around the
Boulevard, where Short lived his entire life, raised the possibility that
Short was exposed to environmental toxins. Several avenues of inquiry
were necessary to complete this portion of Short's social history,
including: (a) questioning family and friends about the Short family's
water sources, outdoor activities, and food habits; (b) collecting
documents from state and local environmental agencies and from each
of the individual factories in the Boulevard; (c) interviewing representa-
tives from the local and state environmental offices for answers to
questions raised by the documents; and (d) researching news accounts
about environmental problems in the Boulevard.
These efforts revealed that the Boulevard was essentially a toxic waste
dump. From the time he was five-years-old until the time of the crime,
Short's family lived approximately 100 yards from an area that was later
designated an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) superfund site.
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For over forty years, a variety of industrial businesses-including two
paint manufacturers, a furniture company, a wastewater treatment
facility, a paper mill, and a nuclear power plant-routinely dumped toxic
wastes into the water supply and surrounding grounds where Short
spent his formative years. The Short family relied on well water drawn
from the same ground where toxic chemicals were routinely deposited.
Despite efforts by some state and local authorities to regulate discharges
near the Boulevard, the businesses routinely failed to do anything to
improve the situation. Local authorities in particular tried to prevent
the pollution by sending warning letters, conducting ground and water
inspections, and even filing a series of lawsuits against offending
businesses. Still, the pollution persisted. State politicians stepped in,
putting pressure on local authorities to back off of businesses that
brought important jobs and revenues to the state. Backed with support
by more powerful, state-level figures, the businesses simply ignored local
efforts to address their polluting. The state pollution-control authority
wrote a letter concerning one particular offending factory, describing the
situation as follows:
The Print Works Factory discharge exists now much the same as it did
before court proceedings were brought against it ten years ago. On
inspection, we found a most disgusting situation, with extremely large
amounts of excessively strong dye wastes and viscous pigments from
their operation discharged directly into the feeding waters of the river.
The firm has made no apparent attempt to alleviate the situation and
certainly no progress has been made in the fight to upgrade the water
quality with such discharges present. The apparent apathy of the firm
concerning the problem is very evident in its lack of civic and environ-
mental responsibility to the people and area directly affected by its
pollution.
Short regularly swam, fished, and played in the same waterway
described in that letter. An expert in marine biology reviewed nearly
7000 pages of documents related to the pollution problem on the
Boulevard and concluded that Short had likely been exposed to lead,
zinc, magnesium, heavy metal copper, and organic contaminants, all at
levels known to be unsafe to humans due to their potential to cause
cognitive and neurological impairments. This danger is especially true
for children: they are uniquely susceptible to environmental exposure to
toxic compounds because their bodies are developing more actively than
those of adults. Children also tend to have greater exposure to
environmental toxins due to their recreational activity patterns and
greater hand-to-mouth behavior.
Based on the information developed from Short's social history, his
post-conviction team decided to take steps to test for neurological
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damage. First, a neuropsychologist evaluated Short and found that he
scored below normal on a variety of tests designed to measure verbal
reasoning, abstract reasoning, impulsive responses, and tactual
memory-functions that are largely associated with the prefrontal and
central cortex areas of the brain. The neuropsychologist also conducted
a QEEG study that supported the neuropsychological test findings by
pointing to various degrees of brain damage in these same areas of the
brain.3 s Based on these results, Short's counsel then discussed the case
with a psychiatrist and neurologist, who advised them that based on the
information available from all sources, Short clearly had neurological
dysfunction, and there was a significant likelihood that brain abnormali-
ties would be evident from neuroimaging. The psychiatrist and
neurologist recommended that an MRI and PET scan be conducted.
Visual and quantitative analyses of the MRI and PET scan data revealed
significant abnormalities in both the structure of Short's brain and the
manner in which it functioned. The detected abnormalities were
consistent with brain damage resulting from fetal alcohol exposure and
environmental toxin exposure.
Short's trial attorneys were largely unaware of his life history. The
social worker they hired conducted brief interviews with Short's two
sisters and an aunt. The social worker also collected some, but not all,
of his school and medical records. Aside from that, the defense team
collected no other information about his background. Had Short's trial
counsel collected the complete social history that was later uncovered
after Short's conviction, the story about how he ended up shooting
Officer Simon and the penalty phase plea for his life could have both
been very different. Short was not just an average kid who may have
had some hard lumps in life like everyone else. He was the product of
a complex series of personal disadvantages. Before he was even born,
his mother's choices contributed to brain damage that would affect him
throughout his life-impairing his judgment, diminishing his ability to
control his impulses, and damaging his adeptness at reasoning, decision
making, and planning. His general poverty and chaotic home life
compounded his problems and contributed to his family's inability to
escape an environment in which Short was exposed to toxic chemicals,
resulting in further damage to Short's brain. On the day that Officer
Simon was killed, Short was operating with an abnormal brain and a
lifetime of disadvantages. He was not just a drunk who decided to kill
a cop out of spite. The images of Short's brain damage corroborate this
story and visually depict the story's result, but the images are not the
38. A "QEEG" is a quantitative electroencephalogram.
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story itself. In other words, there was a much more compelling story to
be told on Short's behalf, and the results of the neuroimaging played an
important part in completing that picture.
IV. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF NEUROMAGES IN CAPITAL
CASES
Although neuroimaging can be a relevant and useful piece of
mitigation evidence, the decision to go forward with brain imaging is not
one to be taken lightly or made quickly. There are a number of potential
risks to be considered when thinking about the use of neuroimaging in
a capital case. This section discusses several risks that we have
discovered in their own cases or witnessed in others.
A. Errors in Analysis
One potential risk of neuroimaging to consider is the risk of error in
the analysis of neuroimages. Traditionally, neuroimages have been
analyzed by a visual review of the films by a radiologist or neurologist.
This method of analysis gives rise to problems of subjectivity, bias, and
other human errors:
Brain imaging is the product of a complex set of techniques, subjective
decisions, technical choices, and informed interpretations. Scientists,
technicians, and clinicians decide the level of detail they will use to
scan the brain. They must determine what types of imaging should be
ordered, how thick or thin the slices should be, the degree of clarity,
the difference in contrast between types of tissue, and how the signal
should be filtered from background noise.'
The case of Robert South illustrates this point. In 1983 South was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death for the drive-by shooting of
a police officer.' The facts of the crime were rather bizarre in that
South had no prior history of violence.4 ' South had apparently been
driving down the highway in his pickup truck when he spotted an officer
on the opposite side of the road making a traffic stop. South aimed a
rifle out of his driver's side window and shot the officer once in the head.
39. Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in
the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 249 (2007).
40. State v. South, 427 S.E.2d 666, 668 (S.C. 1993).
41. John Blume served as counsel for Robert South in his federal habeas corpus
proceedings and at his motion for new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence.




South was arrested less than a minute later." Friends and family
could offer no explanation for South's actions.
Prior to South's trial in 1983, a CT scan of his brain was conducted.
The radiologist who reviewed the film read the scan as normal. Six
years later, an MRI revealed a brain tumor that the radiologist had
previously failed to discover. There was no dispute that the tumor
existed in 1983. In fact, the tumor was clearly visible on the previously
produced CT scan. The tumor was approximately the size of a walnut.
It was located on the pineal gland of the brain and had not grown
substantially in size, if at all, since the time of South's trial.'
Little was known about South's particular type of tumor at the time,
but it was of the same type and located in the same area of the brain as
those at issue in several other cases with similarly bizarre facts. For
example, on August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman, a twenty-four-year-old
former Marine and University of Texas student, murdered his wife and
mother." Then he purchased ammunition and a shotgun and climbed
the bell tower at the University of Texas, killing two more people along
the way." From the tower he opened fire, killing eleven more people
below before he was shot by police officers." Prior to the killings,
Whitman wrote a note: "Lately, (I can't recall when it started) I have
been the victim of many unusual and irrational thoughts."47 Whit-
man's autopsy revealed a tumor that impacted the same area of the
brain where South's tumor was located." The role that Whitman's
tumor may have played in his actions was later debated."' Because
Whitman died before he could be tried for his crimes, a jury was never
given the opportunity to decide the tumor's significance.
In Robert South's case, the radiologist who had previously read the CT
scan as normal was confronted with the former scan and the newly
obtained MRI film. The radiologist acknowledged that he had made an
egregious error, saying, "Oh my god, how could I have missed it?" The
General Sessions Court of Lexington County, South Carolina, granted
South a new sentencing proceeding after determining that the evidence
of his brain tumor would probably have changed the outcome of the
penalty phase.o Although the kind of gross error that occurred in
42. South, 427 S.E.2d at 668.
43. Id.






50. South, 427 S.E.2d at 670.
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South's case is still a risk today, often the risk of error is even greater
than in South's case because the relevant evidentiary findings are likely
to be more subtle and more open to subjectivity than a clearly visible
tumor that is the size of a walnut. In smaller markets, this problem is
often compounded by the absence of a specialist in neurology who can
interpret the scans. Instead, a general radiologist will typically be the
one to read the scans. Even when a specialist is available, often times
the specialist's training is not specific to the kind of inquiry relevant to
capital cases. And as discussed above, even with the best equipment
available and specialists trained specifically to look for more subtle
findings, subjectivity is still always an issue, which increases the
potential for error. The methods of quantitative analysis described in
Part II.D. remove some of the subjectivity factors and are therefore more
likely to be reliable.
B. Overreliance on Imaging
Another major risk of neuroimaging to consider is the negative impact
of overreliance on imaging. Many types of brain dysfunction are not
detectible through neuroimaging. A "normal" brain scan can negate
other clinically sound evidence of brain dysfunction detected through
sophisticated neuropsychological testing. However, jurors and judg-
es-like laypersons-may not necessarily understand this fact. Jurors are
more likely to dismiss even clinically sound evidence of brain dysfunction
if the "picture" of the brain does not "reveal" the impairment."
Likewise, judges are more likely to make erroneous evidentiary and
funding decisions if they are operating under the misperception that no
brain damage exists because the neuroimage is "normal."
For example, at the 2002 capital trial of Kevin Mercer, the defense
team attempted to call Dr. John Steedman, a neurologist and psychia-
trist, to testify that a SPECT scan of Mercer's brain showed a significant
abnormality.5 2  Mercer was charged with an armed robbery and
shooting that occurred while he and a codefendant were carjacking their
victim.s" Dr. Steedman was prepared to testify that the scan showed
reduced blood flow and activity in the left orbitofrontal cortex of the
brain, an area that "a lot of experts in the field of functional brain
imaging" have identified as being "associated with memory problems,
51. See John H. Blume, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Cases: The Elements of a
Competent and Reliable Mental Health Examination, ADVOCATE, Aug. 1995, at 9, available
at http//apps.dpa.ky.gov/library/advocate/pdf/1995/adv081995.pdf.
52. Transcript of Record at 2263,2274, State v. Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556 (S.C. 2009) (No.
26582).
53. See Mercer, 672 S.E.2d at 558-59.
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emotional problems, and judgment and planning problems."' The
State objected to Dr. Steedman's proposed testimony, claiming unfair
surprise based on the radiologist's report that the defense had previously
disclosed."s The radiology report stated that the purpose of the SPECT
scan was to look for "dementia," and as to this inquiry, the radiologist
determined that the scan showed a "questionable abnormality."' The
radiologist opined, "I do not believe this is an adequate etiology for
dementia or other severe abnormality." The State argued that the
report said nothing was wrong with Mercer's brain, but the defense
expert planned to testify to the opposite conclusion." The court sided
with the State, saying,
When I read that report, that report is normal. And this expert-and
so the state reading that says, reasonably, no need to do anything.
Then he comes in and gives a different opinion and now-
I mean, I know it says, "questionable abnormality." I can read it. But
that-that-questionable abnormality is not something that jumps right
out as this opinion does. Definite abnormality is what he's saying."
The court also asserted that because it viewed the radiologist's report as
in conflict with Dr. Steedman's testimony, Dr. Steedman's opinion may
not even be admissible from an evidentiary perspective: "from a legal
standpoint, questionable calls into question, first of all, its admissibili-
ty."60 Ultimately, the court ruled that Dr. Steedman could testify, but
he could not give his opinion that the SPECT scan showed any
abnormality." Since the abnormality was the main point of Dr.Steed-
man's testimony, he no longer had much to say. During the State's
questioning of Dr. Steedman, the State took the opportunity to repeated-
ly suggest that there was nothing wrong with Mercer's brain:
Q: A SPECT scan measures blood flow. Is that your testimony?
A: Yes.
Q: Blood flow in the brain? The report that you have from the
radiologist ....
54. Transcript of Record, supra note 52, at 2281-82.
55. Id. at 2279-80.
56. Id. at 2277.
57. Id. at 2274.
58. Id. at 2282.
59. Id. at 2285-86.
60. Id. at 2286.
61. Id.
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... He-when he took a look at this, his impression was a questionable
abnormality. Correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And he says that, "I do not believe that it is an adequate
etiology for dementia nor other severe abnormality." Isn't that correct?
A. That's what it says.
Q: And you are not here to testify to this jury that a questionable
abnormality whose significance is questionable was the cause for Kevin
Mercer committing a carjacking in May of 2002, are you?
A: No, not as a proximate cause. No.
Q: And you are not here to say that a questionable abnormality
whose significance is questionable was the cause of Kevin Mercer
putting a gun and shooting [the victim] in the back of the head in May
of 2002 either, are you?
A: I think what I would say what I am here to do-
Q: Before you answer, if you could just say yes or no.
A: Yes.
Q: You are saying that the-that was the cause that that-
A: Depends on what you mean by the cause, sir. Do you-
Q: That he did this because of a questionable abnormality who the
radiologist said significance is questionable .... That is not what
you're here for, is it?
A: I would say in my opinion, my expert opinion that I'm here for,
is that if you have an abnormality of the brain, this can be a contribu-
tory factor to having poor judgement.
Q: A contributing factor to poor judgment.
A: Uh-huh.
Q: If you have an abnormality of the brain; right?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: But what we have here in this report is a questionable
abnormality; correct?
A: That's what's reported.62
Dr. Steedman was the last defense expert to testify in the penalty phase.
Kevin Mercer was sentenced to death a few hours later.'
Although this Article focuses on examples and advice distilled from
our own cases, an informal survey of reported decisions in other capital
cases suggests that the error of overreliance on imaging affects the
outcome in many cases. We have collected and reviewed approximately
62. Id. at 2307-10.
63. Emily Paavola currently represents Kevin Mercer in his state post-conviction relief
proceedings.
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seventy-five opinions discussing the use of neuroimaging in capital cases
in various procedural contexts. The cases generally fall within four
procedural categories: (1) post-conviction cases in which trial counsel are
alleged to have been ineffective for failing to obtain or utilize neuro-
images at trial;6' (2) posttrial claims of newly discovered evidence;"
(3) funding requests;"6 and (4) direct appeal opinions discussing the use
or admissibility of neuroimages at trial." We looked most closely at
the first three categories of claims. All three categories involve claims
requiring some showing of prejudice or materiality." The overwhelm-
ing majority of these decisions discuss unsuccessful claims asserted on
behalf of capital defendants. The most common reason that the claims
were denied was that some other preexisting evidence, usually structural
imaging of the brain, suggested that no brain damage was present.69
V. CONCLUSION-LESSONS FROM THE FRONT
The question of whether the defense team should utilize neuroimaging
in preparation for the penalty phase of a capital trial does not have a
64. See, e.g., Head v. Carr, 544 S.E.2d 409 (S. Ct. Ga. 2001); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d
1207 (10th Cir. 2003); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294 (S. Ct. Fla. 2007).
65. See, e.g., Smith v. Anderson, 402 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2005); Taylor v. State, 3 So. 3d
986 (S. Ct. Fla. 2009).
66. See, e.g., Clayton v. Roper, 515 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2008); Sexton v. State, 997 So.
2d 1073 (S. Ct. Fla. 2008).
67. See, e.g., Philmore v. McNeil, 575 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2009); Brant v. State, 21 So.
3d 1276 (S. Ct. Fla. 2009).
68. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, for example, the claimant
must first prove deficient performance (that his trial counsel's performance was
unreasonable) and prejudice (that but for his trial counsel's error, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different). Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To win a new trial based on evidence discovered
posttrial, the claimant generally has to show that the new evidence "(1) would probably
change the result if a new trial is had; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not
have been discovered before trial; [and] (4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence,"
or in a capital case, to the penalty phase of the trial. South, 427 S.E.2d at 668-70. To
prove that a trial court erred in denying a request for funding, the claimant must show
that he or she had a particularized need for the funding and that the denial of funding
resulted in prejudice. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985).
69. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 742 So. 2d 233, 237 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that newly
discovered evidence of a PET scan showing that the defendant had a seizure disorder would
not have affected the outcome of his trial because a CT scan and EEG taken before trial
had both been normal); Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 15-17 (Fla. 1999) (holding that denial
of funds for expert services for a neuroradiologist, a behavioral neurologist, and a SPECT
scan did not violate defendant's right to a mental health evaluation under Ake and that
defendant could not show a particularized need nor prejudice because a pretrial MRI did
not show any brain damage).
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one-size-fits-all answer. If the theme of the mitigation case-at trial or
in post-conviction-involves brain damage or neurological impairment,
neuroimaging can be very effective. However, as we have explained,
there are some major risks to consider. There is no easy solution, but
the following steps must be taken before any imaging studies are even
considered.
First, the defense team must conduct a comprehensive, multigenera-
tional investigation of the defendant's social history. This investigation
is the foundation of any competent and reliable mental health evaluation
in a criminal case. Neuroimaging is neither a substitute for a compre-
hensive social history investigation nor a shortcut that can be used to
streamline an investigation. In short, in the capital defense setting,
neuroimaging is not an investigative tool at all. In the right cases, it is
a tool used to confirm the presence of brain dysfunction, not to investi-
gate whether the client in fact has brain damage. Thus, neuroimaging
should never be considered until the social history investigation is
completed.
Second, in most cases, neuropsychological testing should be conducted,
especially if there have been no previous neuropsychological assess-
ments. A neuropsychological test battery is the most reliable method of
assessing whether the client has brain dysfunction. The tests will help
assess whether neuroimaging should be considered, but the tests will
rarely be determinative of the wisdom of pursuing brain imaging.
Third, depending on the results of the social history investigation and
neuropsychological testing, the client should be examined by a neurolo-
gist or a neuropsychiatrist. This should include a physical examination.
Depending on the results of the neurological or neuropsychiatric
examination, considered in light of the social history and neuropsycho-
logical examination, the attorney is ready to discuss the wisdom of
neuroimaging with his or her expert. In the majority of cases, the expert
will advise against neuroimaging. Many types of brain abnormalities
will not be testable by the neuroimaging techniques and analysis
methods available to indigent defendants. Thus, in a significant number
of cases, having an MRI or PET conducted can only generate evidence
that will be misused by the prosecution (as Kevin Mercer's case
illustrates) in an attempt to persuade the fact-finder that the defendant's
brain is normal.
Finally, if neuroimaging has previously been conducted and the film
was read as "normal," the attorney should have the films and underlying
data examined by your own expert. Given the variables of inadequate
training, incompetence, and human error, it is possible (as Robert
South's case illustrates) that the previous examination confirms, rather
than negates, brain dysfunction.
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